This paper analyzes empirically the relationship between money market uncertainty and unexpected deviations in retail interest rates in a sample of ten OECD countries. We find that, with the exception of the United States, money market uncertainty has only a modest impact on the conditional volatility of retail interest rates. Even for the United States, we find that the effects of money market uncertainty are spread out over time. Our results also indicate that money market uncertainty tends to be passed on to retail rates to a lesser extent in countries where banking relationships play a substantial role.
INTRODUCTION
Retail interest rates are an important determinant of the saving and investment decisions of households and firms in most economies. Bank lending rates are a key indicator of the marginal cost of short-term external funding for firms (Borio and Fritz, 1995) . In addition, the interest rate pass-through process is a pivotal element of the monetary transmission mechanism, since it determines how strongly policy-induced variations in money market rates are transmitted to lending and deposit rates and ultimately to saving and investment. Hence, retail interest rates play an important role in macroeconomic fluctuations and also in the transmission of monetary policy (Ehrmann et al., 2003; Issing, 2002) .
Consequently, it is not surprising that retail interest rates and the pricing behavior of banks have been the focus of several studies (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994; De Bondt, 2005 ; De Bondt and Mojon, 2005; Kleimeier and Sander, 2006; Mojon, 2000; Sander and Kleimeier, 2004) . A typical finding is that retail interest rates adjust sluggishly to changes in market interest rates. Berger and Udell (1992) interpret the relatively smooth behavior of bank lending rates as an indication for risk-sharing arrangements between a bank and a risk-averse customer (Fried and Howitt, 1980) . 1 Basically, banks offer relatively stable retail interest rates, despite the occurrence of shocks that give rise to volatile market interest rates and thereby shield their customers from shocks to interest rates.
So far, the literature has concentrated on the first-moment properties of the interest rate pass-through process. In this paper, we go one step further and investigate the second-moment relationship between market and retail interest rates. More precisely, we address the question to what extent money market uncertainty, as measured by the volatility of money market interest rates, impacts upon unexpected retail rate fluctuations. If implicit insurance against interest rate shocks characterizes a banking system, we should observe that the correlation between measures of money market volatility and unexpected changes in retail rates is low. Thus, our analysis represents a test of the hypothesis that an implicit insurance against interest rate shocks is a source of limited pass-through. Since our focus is on the conditional volatility of retail interest rates, our analysis captures the insurance element to a greater extent than the existing literature. In addition, by using a Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) framework (Bollerslev, 1986) , we are able to provide a more detailed description of the transmission of volatility from the money market to retail rates.
In our analysis, we explore volatility linkages in a sample of ten OECD countries. Fried and Howitt (1980) show that implicit insurance requires longstanding relationships. Consequently, risk-sharing arrangements between banks and customers are more likely to develop in bank-based financial systems (Allen and Gale, 2000) . Since our sample includes countries characterized by marketbased financial systems as well as countries that are better characterized by bank-based systems, we are able to compare volatility linkages across financial systems.
We find that the influence of money market volatility on the conditional volatility of retail interest rates is rather limited for almost all countries under consideration. Hence, it appears that the banking sectors do not fully transmit volatility to retail interest rates and, in this sense, contribute to financial and macroeconomic stability. In addition, our results indicate that the degree to which money market uncertainty is passed on to retail rates is lower in countries where banking relationships play a larger role. Hence, our results are in line with the interpretation that the low impact of conditional money market volatility on retail interest rate fluctuations is the result of insurance against interest rate volatility.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 surveys and discusses the literature that provides the theoretical basis for our analysis, and Section 3 outlines our empirical strategy. In Section 4, we discuss the role of banking relationships in the countries in our sample. Section 5 presents the estimation results, and Section 6 summarizes and concludes the paper.
THEORETICAL MOTIVATION
In this section, we review and discuss the literature that provides the theoretical basis for our empirical analysis. Fried and Howitt (1980) show theoretically that rigid lending rates may be the result of a risk-sharing arrangement, where a bank insures a risk-averse borrower against fluctuations in lending rates. Suppose, for instance, that the economy is hit by a liquidity shock at the macroeconomic level. That is, firms need to obtain additional external finance and also households may find themselves in a situation where they unexpectedly need additional liquidity. Note that the shock hits all sectors of the economy symmetrically; hence, it can only be smoothed intertemporally and not cross-sectionally (see Allen and Gale, 2000, Ch. 6) . Now, consider a firm that needs to borrow additional funds. The firm may raise these funds by borrowing in financial markets. However, since we are assuming that the additional demand for liquidity is due to an aggregate shock, funds are likely to be available only at higher borrowing costs, reflecting the higher, economy-wide demand for liquidity.
Financial intermediaries, in contrast, hold a buffer stock of liquid assets that can be run down to provide the extra liquidity needed. That is, banks are in a position to provide insurance against such a shock. Allen and Santomero (1999) argue that especially in recent years, when the traditional banking business has somewhat declined, banks have increasingly offered risk-sharing services via dynamically adjusting their buffer stocks of liquid assets in response to shocks.
The question remains as to why banks should provide relatively cheap funds to their customers while they might be able to earn higher profits due to the higher demand for liquidity. The reason is twofold: first, although banks offer cheap loans in times of a relatively high demand for liquidity, they may also charge higher rates in times of positive liquidity shocks and are thereby compensated in times of excess liquidity. Second, banks may be compensated in the form of a higher average interest rate.
In short, if banks indeed offer insurance against liquidity risk, then bank lending rates should on average be higher than market rates, indicating a type of insurance premium. The existing literature on interest rate insurance has concentrated on lending rates. 2 Nevertheless, the same arguments also apply to deposit rates. Thus, one would expect deposit rates to be below market interest rates. In addition, we also expect retail rates in general to be adjusted less frequently and to a smaller extent than market rates.
A large empirical literature on the so-called interest rate pass-through documents that retail rates indeed do not fully respond to fluctuations in market interest rates at least in the short run (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994; De Bondt, 2005; De Bondt and Mojon, 2005; Kleimeier and Sander, 2006; Mojon, 2000; Sander and Kleimeier, 2004) . Although the long-run pass-through is typically found to be higher and, in some cases, close to unity, banks at least smooth retail rates over a substantial time period. Berger and Udell (1992) explicitly point out that this 'stickiness' of loan rates is consistent with the type of insurance against liquidity shocks outlined here. In a similar fashion, Ehrmann et al. (2003) speculate that banks in the euro area might shield their customers from fluctuations in interest rates, which may have implications for the conduct and evaluation of monetary policy.
Liquidity insurance is likely to be offered only if long-run relationships develop between banks and their customers. If banks smooth liquidity shocks in the manner described above, then banks offer relatively lower (higher) lending (deposit) rates with respect to market rates in times of high demand for liquidity. And, vice versa, in times of excess liquidity, they offer relatively higher (lower) lending (deposit) rates. Hence, multiple interactions with the same customer are necessary, which is typical for relationship banking. In the model presented in Fried and Howitt (1980) , risk-sharing arrangements never occur if the switching to a new trading partner is costless. Thus, in addition to alleviating problems associated with asymmetric information, long-term relationships can give rise to insurance against liquidity shocks and sticky retail interest rates (see e.g. Allen and Gale, 2000, Ch. 15; Boot, 2000) . Consequently, insurance against liquidity shocks is more likely to be encountered in bank-based financial systems where lending and also deposit relationships are predominant and the competition from financial markets is limited.
Several authors investigate empirically the effect of relationships on borrowing costs, collateral requirements and the availability of credit in general. Berger and Udell (1995) report that relationships reduce borrowing costs. Similar results are reported in Angelini et al. (1998) for small Italian cooperative banks. Petersen and Rajan (1994) , in contrast, find no effect of the length of the relationship on borrowing costs. In this paper, we ask a related question, namely, how fluctuations in retail rates may be related to relationships.
Concerning the link between relationships and the availability of credit, the results reported in the literature are more clear-cut. Rajan (1994, 1995) , and also Berger and Udell (1995) , find that the access to credit is 2. An exception is Berlin and Mester (1998) , who analyze lending and deposit rates. They argue that banks can offer stable lending rates because the supply of deposits responds only inelastically to changes in market interest rates. easier, the longer a relationship lasts. Note that this result provides some evidence in favor of the hypothesis that relationships help to smooth variations in liquidity by ensuring the availability of liquidity.
METHODOLOGY
Our strategy for assessing the link between uncertainty in the money market and retail interest rates consists of three steps: we first quantify the extent to which realized retail rates deviate from their expected value. To this end, we estimate a regression relationship between market interest rates and retail rates for each country. The absolute values of the regression residuals measure the size of unexpected retail rate deviations. Next, we fit a GARCH model to shortterm money market rates to obtain a measure for money market uncertainty.
Here, we assume that the conditional standard deviation of the short-term money market interest rate is a useful indicator of the degree of uncertainty in the money market. Finally, we estimate a relationship between unexpected retail rate deviations and our measure of money market uncertainty. Let us look at the individual steps in more detail. In the first step, we estimate a standard 'interest rate pass-through' equation (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994; De Bondt and Mojon, 2005) :
where R t denotes the retail interest rate, R m t is the short-term money market rate, R b t is the long-term government bond yield, and D is the difference operator. As in De Bondt and Mojon (2005) , we include the long-term bond yield in addition to the short-term money market rate to capture term structure considerations.
Our study includes Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. We use monthly IFS data on deposit and lending retail interest rates, money market interest rates and long-term government bond yields over the period January 1990 to September 2005. The sample sizes differ somewhat due to limited data availability for some countries. Table 1 shows the results of augmented Dickey and Fuller (1979) tests for our data series and confirms that almost all series are integrated of order one. Hence, we estimate (1) in first differences, which is also the standard approach in the literature. 3 If market and retail rates are cointegrated, then (1) may be extended to an error-correction model. Although many studies use error-correction models to study interest rate pass-through, the empirical evidence on cointegration between market rates and retail rates is mixed. 4 Table 2 shows the results of the residual-based test for cointegration proposed by Engle and Granger (1987) . We reject the null of no cointegration between deposit rates and market rates in Australia, Belgium, Germany, Portugal, Spain and the United States at standard levels of statistical significance. Deposit rates appear to be cointegrated with market rates in Canada, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. Overall, we obtain a rather heterogeneous picture with respect to cointegration. In addition, the length of our series may be rather short for an analysis of long-run equilibrium relationships. Therefore, we proceed by estimating (1) without an error-correction term as our baseline specification. However, given the mixed evidence on cointegration, we reestimate (1) as an error-correction model, as a robustness check. Note that this extension basically amounts to adding an additional regressor and therefore 'whithens' the residuals and reduces the potential heteroskedasticity Kwapil and Scharler (2006) reject the null hypothesis of cointegration for aggregate euro-area and US data. In contrast, Moazzami (1999) reports that interest rates are cointegrated with market rates in the United States and also in Canada. Kleimeier and Sander (2006) analyze retail rates from individual euro-area countries and find some evidence for asymmetric error correction for some types of retail rates. associated with the error term in (1). Since we are primarily interested in modeling and analyzing this heteroskedasticity, we are biasing the results against finding any influence of market interest rate volatility. Nevertheless, our empirical results turn out to be robust with respect to this modification. 5 We apply a standard GARCH model to the short-term money market rate to quantify money market uncertainty. More precisely, we estimate a specification of the form
where money market rate changes DR m t are modeled as an autoregressive process with time-varying conditional variance h 2 t . We choose the number of lags j, m and n in (2) and (3) individually for each country on the basis of statistically significant model coefficients and diagnostic checks of the residuals in (2). In particular, we check whether the standardized residuals in (2) are uncorrelated and homoskedastic. The conditional volatility of shortterm market rates should mirror the liquidity situation for short-term funds. However, we remain agnostic with respect to the ultimate source of changes in interest rates. Changes could be due to monetary policy actions or more generally due to any other type of shock impacting upon the level of liquidity and bank reserves.
Our main focus is on the relationship between unexpected retail rate deviations and money market uncertainty as reflected by the conditional standard deviation h t . Hence, we estimate the equation
Note that we proxy retail interest rate uncertainty by the absolute value ofê t . Usingê 2 t instead of the absolute deviation leaves our conclusions unchanged. If l 1 5 1, then money market uncertainty is completely and contemporaneously passed on to retail rates. If banks provide insurance against interest rate shocks, then they should shield their customers from uncertainty associated with market interest rates. In other words, if risk-sharing arrangements are a special feature of banking relationships, we would expect h t to have only a small effect onê t j j. Thus, l 1 o1 is consistent with the interpretation that banks provide insurance. l 1 5 0 implies that money market uncertainty has no impact on the conditional volatility of retail rates in the short run.
l 1 captures only the contemporaneous impact of money market uncertainty on retail rate volatility. Based on (4), we may also analyze the long-run effect of money market uncertainty that takes into account the fact that money market uncertainty may be transmitted with a lag. The long-run effect of money market uncertainty is l 1 /(1 À l 2 ). If l 1 /(1 À l 2 )o1, or, equivalently, l 1 þ l 2 o1, then the impact of money market uncertainty on retail rate volatility is limited even in the long run. That is, banks do not only smooth the impact of money market uncertainty over time, but also absorb money market volatility to some extent.
It has to be pointed out that our focus on retail rates may only partially account for the extent of insurance against liquidity shocks. For instance, even if money market uncertainty does not affect the volatility of lending rates, banks may still impose stricter collateral requirements and thereby ration the amount of credit without adjusting lending rates. However, the empirical literature finds that relationships typically increase the availability of credit ( Petersen and Rajan, 1995) . Hence, our approach, albeit somewhat narrow, still captures an important element of implicit insurance arrangements.
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS AND BANKING RELATIONSHIPS
Before we present the estimation results, we briefly discuss the role of relationships in the countries under consideration. As described in detail in Section 2, banking relationships are an important prerequisite for risk-sharing arrangements to emerge. Thus, we expect to find a lower impact on lending rate volatility in countries where relationship banking plays an important role.
The second column of Table 3 shows bank assets (BA) as a fraction of stock market capitalization (SMC), which we interpret as a proxy for the financial system. The higher the BA relative to the capitalization of the stock market, the more bank based the financial system. Data on BA and on stock market capitalization are obtained from Beck et al. (2007) .
Since risk-sharing arrangements are more likely to develop in bank-based financial systems, where the competition from financial markets is low, we interpret this variable as a first proxy for the role of relationships (Allen and Santomero, 1999) . We see that in the continental European countries in our sample, banks tend to be relatively more important. In the remaining countries, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, stock market capitalization tends to be higher relative to BA and therefore these countries are better described as market-based financial systems.
Several attempts have been made to characterize countries according to the importance of relationships. Ehrmann et al. (2003) report the importance of lending relationships for a sample of euro-area countries. Semenov (2006) analyzes a broader sample of OECD countries and summarizes qualitatively the informed opinions of researchers on the relationship between firms and banks.
Not surprisingly, in market-based systems, which are characteristic for Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, relationships do not appear to be important and arm's-length lending is the dominant form of bank lending. Hence, we expect to find that banks shelter their customers only to a small extent from money market uncertainty. In Germany, in contrast, we expect that banks shield their customers from money market uncertainty, since lending relationships are particularly close (Semenov, 2006) . Put differently, we expect to find little impact of market volatility in Germany.
Although Belgium, Portugal and Spain may also classified as bank-based systems according to the relative sizes of the banking sectors, relationships appear to be of minor importance according to Ehrmann et al. (2003) . Thus, we expect a stronger impact of money market uncertainty in these countries.
Italy and the Netherlands are somewhat more difficult to classify. According to the relative size of the banking sector, we classify Italy as a bank-based economy, which is consistent with Ehrmann et al. (2003) , who report that relationships are very important in Italy. Semenov (2006) , however, finds that arm's-length lending is the prevailing form of bank lending in Italy. Similarly, Ehrmann et al. (2003) argue that lending relationships are at least important in the Netherlands, whereas Semenov (2006) classifies the Netherlands as being Ehrmann et al. (2003) . The last column shows the dominant type of lending relationship as reported in Semenov (2006) . characterized by arm's-length lending. Although the banking sector is relatively large in the Netherlands, the ratio of bank assets to stock market capitalization is the lowest among the continental European countries in our sample. Hence, the Netherlands occupies an intermediate position.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The first step of our analysis consists of estimating equation (1). We estimate the equation with current short-and long-term interest rates, three lags of them and three lags of the retail rate to capture any first-moment dynamics in retail rates. Table 4 shows the estimates of immediate and long-run pass-through. The coefficient a 0 in (1) measures the immediate pass-through. The long-run pass-through is a l ¼ ð P 3 i¼0 a i Þ=ð1 À P 3 i¼1 b i Þ, which we calculate based on the estimated coefficients from (1).
The left block in Table 4 shows the results for deposit rates. Immediate pass-through varies from around zero in the Netherlands and Portugal to 0.75 in Australia and the long-run pass-through ranges from 0.01 in Portugal to Table 4 indicate that the long-run pass-through tends to be higher in the case of lending rates. For the United States and the Netherlands, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of complete long-run pass-through. The main focus of our analysis is on unexpected deviations in retail interest rates. It is therefore important that equation (1) adequately captures the conditional mean dynamics in retail interest rates. When this is the case, the residuals from (1) should be serially uncorrelated. Tests for residual serial correlation are therefore a natural model specification test. Standard tests for serial correlation assume that the disturbances are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) under the null hypothesis. For our purpose, the i.i.d. assumption is too strong, however, since unexpected retail interest rate deviations must be uncorrelated but they may well display heteroskedasticity. Moreover, Monte Carlo evidence reported in Silvapulle and Evans (1998) indicates that asymptotic critical values of standard tests for serial correlation are not valid when the assumption of homoskedasticity is violated. We therefore use a heteroskedasticity-robust serial correlation test based on artificial regressions to examine the residuals from equation (1). The test can be computed from the regression
where c j is a coefficient,ê t is the tth residual from the estimated equation (1) and r t ðZ j jXÞ is the tth residual from a regression of the jth column of a matrix of test regressors Z on the matrix X of the explanatory variables in (1). In our case the matrix Z contains lagged residualsê tÀj from (1). The test statistic n À SSR, where n denotes the number of observations and SSR is the sum of squared residuals, is asymptotically chi-square distributed with r degrees of freedom. The test is asymptotically valid in the presence of heteroskedasticity of an unknown form when exogeneous variables as well as lagged dependent variables enter the regression equation. 6 We include one, three and five lags ofê t in the test regressor matrix Z, respectively. Hence, we test against AR(1), AR(3) and AR(5) residual dynamics as well as against MA(1), MA(3) and MA(5) residual dynamics, since under the null hypothesis, the procedure to test against AR(q) and MA(q) alternatives is identical. Table 5 reports the results from the specification tests. The results show that serial correlation does not appear to be a problem. Only in very few cases is the null hypothesis marginally rejected. Robustness checks (available 6. For more details, see Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, Chs. 11 and 16) and MacKinnon (1992) .
on request) show that in those few cases, our results are not affected by serial correlation. To see whether structural breaks affect our specification of the conditional mean dynamics of retail interest rates, we conduct a test for structural change in equation (1). Again, standard tests are invalid in the presence of heteroskedasticity. As with serial correlation, we therefore base our test on a similar heteroskedasticity-robust artificial regression (see MacKinnon, 1992, for details) . For the euro-area countries, the introduction of the euro in January 1999 is our breakpoint. For the other countries, there does not appear to be an obvious breakpoint. Therefore, we test for a break in the middle of the sample. Table 6 shows that the regression relationships are stable across time for almost all countries. For the few exceptions, taking the structural break into account leaves our main results unaffected.
Let us now turn to the second-moment linkage of market interest rates and retail rates. To conserve space, we do not report the estimation results for equations (2) and (3) from which we generate our measure of money market uncertainty (the results are, of course, available on request). It is worth noting, however, that a standard GARCH(1,1) specification captures the volatility dynamics in the market rate of Australia, Belgium, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. The even simpler ARCH(1) model is sufficient for Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. Only Portugal and Spain require GARCH(1,2) and ARCH(3) specifications, respectively, to adequately describe the second-moment dynamics in the money market interest rate.
As we can see from the left block of Table 7 , the point estimate for l 1 is positive and statistically significant for Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy and the United States. Hence, money market uncertainty significantly affects the conditional volatility of the bank deposit rate in these countries. Moreover, for Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, we find that l 2 is significant, which indicates that deposit rate volatility exhibits some persistence in these countries. However, the point estimates for l 2 are typically small. Hence, most of the impact of money market uncertainty occurs contemporaneously. The results for lending rate uncertainty in the right block of Table 7 show a significant passthrough of money market uncertainty for Australia, Canada, Italy, Spain and the United States. Significant persistence in the volatility of the lending rate is found for Australia, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States.
In short, we find that in most of the countries in our sample, banks pass on money market uncertainty, but only to a limited extent. The exception is the United States, where we cannot reject the hypothesis that money market uncertainty is fully reflected in unexpected deviations in retail rates in the long run. The question remains as to whether the limited impact of unexpected changes in the money market rate can be interpreted as evidence in favor of risk-sharing arrangements. Because long-standing relationships are an important prerequisite for the type of risk-sharing arrangement as discussed in Sections 2 and 4, we expect to find a lower impact of money market uncertainty in economies where relationships are more important.
Consider first the more market-based economies where banking relationships are usually not thought to play an important role (see Table 3 ). Table 7 shows that in the United States, money market uncertainty has a rather strong impact on the conditional volatility of deposit and lending rates, and the null hypothesis that l 1 5 1 cannot be rejected for either the deposit or the lending rate. This result is in line with the view that interest rate insurance is not relevant in the United States. In the United Kingdom, volatility does not seem to exert any effects in the short run, but impacts upon the volatility of deposit and lending rates with a lag, because l 2 is significant for deposit as well as lending rates. In Australia, banks pass on money market volatility to both deposit and lending rates, although to a larger extent to lending rates. Similarly, in Canada, we find that money market uncertainty has a larger influence on lending rates.
Next, we turn to the remaining countries that are better described by a bank-based system. Consider Germany, where the importance of relationships is well documented in the literature. As expected, we find no significant effect of money market uncertainty on the conditional volatility of lending rates. In contrast, we can see from Table 7 that the volatility of money market rates has a small but significant impact on deposit rates. Thus, if the low impact of uncertainty on retail rates is indeed due to the prevalence of relationships, then our results indicate that lending relationships appear to be closer than deposit relationships in Germany. In addition, differences in the extent to which uncertainty is passed through to lending and deposit rates may also have to do with differences in the degree of competition in the markets for loans and deposits. 7 7. Hofmann (2006) argues that competition is rather low in the German banking sector. For the Netherlands, we also find no significant effect on either deposit or lending rate volatility, which is in line with the importance of relationships documented in Ehrmann et al. (2003) .
In Spain and Portugal, arm's-length lending is the dominant form of bank lending. Our results indicate a significant influence on lending rate volatility only for Spain. It has to be noted, however, that the point estimate for l 1 for the lending rate in Portugal is large from an economic point of view and estimated rather imprecisely, which may be due to the short sample. Concerning deposit rates, money market uncertainty matters in Portugal as well as in Spain, as expected, although only with a lag in the latter country.
In Italy, money market uncertainty exerts some influence on deposit and lending rates with a lag. Although these results cast some doubts on the importance of relationships, the magnitudes appear to be small and are therefore consistent with the classification in Ehrmann et al. (2003) . Overall, our results for Italy are not as clear-cut as for the other countries in our sample.
In short, although we find that banks absorb or at least smooth the impact of conditional volatility of the money market rate in almost all countries, we also find that the degree to which money market uncertainty is passed on to retail rates is lower in countries where banking relationships play a larger role.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we analyze the relationship between money market uncertainty and unexpected deviations in retail interest rates. We find that for almost all countries in our sample, the influence of money market uncertainty on the conditional volatility of retail interest rates is rather limited. The only exception is the United States, where money market uncertainty is fully passed through to unexpected deviations of deposit and lending rates in the long run. However, even for the United States, we find that the effects of money market uncertainty are spread out over time. Put differently, banks absorb or at least smooth shocks, which would otherwise affect retail interest rates, and thereby impact upon saving and investment decisions of households and firms. Thus, in this sense, the banking sector contributes to financial and macroeconomic stability.
Although we find that banks in almost all countries absorb or at least smooth the impact of conditional volatility of the money market rate, we also find that the degree to which money market uncertainty is passed on to retail rates is lower in countries where banking relationships play a larger role. Hence, our results are consistent with the interpretation that banking relationships and insurance against interest rate volatility are at least partly responsible for the lower impact of unexpected money market uncertainty.
Our analysis is based on aggregate data, and therefore may not fully account for all dimensions of banking relationships. It appears conceivable that the characteristics of individual banks and the length of individual relationships may be relevant in our context. In addition, a more detailed analysis of the extent of competition among banks may also be relevant for the transmission of volatility to retail rates.
